Pentagon gets sweeping power to remove foreign gear from U.S. power grid

What it does

This bill requires the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan within 180 days to identify, prioritize, and remove equipment and computing facilities in the U.S. electric grid that are owned or controlled by foreign adversaries (primarily China, Russia, Iran, North Korea). The plan must assess risks to military installations and grid reliability, establish removal priorities, and coordinate with states on replacement strategies. Starting in fiscal 2028, the military must submit annual budgets for executing the remediation plan.

Why we flagged it

The bill's core mechanism is a government-directed security audit and remediation plan for critical infrastructure, not a market intervention or private benefit. It is a straightforward national security measure addressing supply-chain vulnerabilities in the electric grid.

What the text implies

• The definition of 'covered equipment' is extremely broad—any internet-connected device with remote-update capability on or near the grid—potentially capturing thousands of devices beyond traditional SCADA systems, including smart meters, sensors, and industrial IoT devices.
• The bill grants DoD and NORTHCOM authority to define 'covered computational facility' via guidance (90 days, then annual updates), creating an evolving regulatory scope that may expand without further congressional action.
• Remediation 'to the standards established under sections 2815 and 2920 of title 10' references military construction and real-property standards; the bill does not specify whether these standards apply to private utility infrastructure or only military-controlled portions of the grid.
• The plan must be submitted in unclassified form with optional classified annex, but the classified portion may contain threat assessments and remediation priorities that Congress and the public cannot review, limiting oversight.
• Annual budget submissions beginning in FY2028 create an open-ended appropriations commitment; no cap on total remediation costs is specified, and the scope may expand as guidance evolves.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

Citizens depend on reliable electricity for essential services; foreign-controlled equipment in the grid poses genuine national security and infrastructure resilience risks. The bill directs government action to remove that risk, with coordination to minimize grid disruption. No restrictions on citizen rights or remedies are imposed.

Who stands to gain

• Defense contractors specializing in grid security and SCADA replacement
• Domestic equipment manufacturers (secure/trusted alternatives to foreign-sourced components)
• Cybersecurity and infrastructure hardening firms
• Utilities and grid operators (potential cost-sharing or federal funding for remediation)

Named in the bill

Secretary of Defense, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Secretaries of military departments, Secretary of Energy, Congressional defense committees, Federal Power Act (section 215A), Title 10 U.S. Code (sections 394, 2815, 2920, 4872), Title 31 CFR section 800.208, Foreign adversaries (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea per section 4872(f))

Where it stands

• Sep 29, 2026 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in Senate”
• Sep 29, 2026 — Referred to Senate Committee on Armed Services · Congress.gov: “Read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.