Franchise bill shields big brands from worker liability claims

What it does

This bill amends federal labor law to define when a franchisor (the company that owns a brand like McDonald's) can be held legally responsible as a 'joint employer' of workers employed by franchisees (the independent business owners who run individual locations). Under current law, courts have increasingly found franchisors to be joint employers when they exercise significant control over working conditions. This bill narrows that definition: a franchisor is a joint employer only if it exercises 'substantial direct and immediate control' over wages, hours, hiring, discipline, or other core employment terms—and it carves out many forms of control (setting brand standards, providing training, enforcing safety rules, recommending staffing levels) as NOT counting as joint-employer control. The effect is to shield franchisors from labor liability and collective bargaining obligations even when they tightly control franchise operations.

Why we flagged it

The bill's operative mechanism is to redefine 'joint employment' in labor law in a way that exempts franchisors from liability for franchisee-employee labor claims. While framed as a 'clarification' of existing law, it functionally narrows worker and franchisee protections by carving out franchisor control activities (brand standards, training, safety rules, staffing guidance) from the definition of joint-employer control.

What the text implies

• The carve-outs for 'brand standards,' 'training materials,' 'minimum training requirements,' and 'operational support' allow franchisors to exercise granular control over how franchisee employees work without triggering joint-employer status—effectively legalizing indirect control while avoiding labor liability.
• Franchisees may find themselves unable to challenge franchisor control as an unfair labor practice or to organize collectively with other franchisees, since the franchisor is no longer a joint employer and thus not subject to NLRA duties.
• The bill applies only prospectively (not to proceedings commenced before enactment), potentially allowing franchisors to escape liability for past labor violations while the new standard shields future conduct.
• Workers at franchise locations lose a key legal avenue (joint-employer claims) to hold the brand-owning company accountable for wage theft, scheduling abuse, or unsafe conditions—even when the franchisor dictates operational standards that affect those conditions.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

Workers employed by franchisees lose the ability to hold franchisors jointly liable for wage theft, unsafe conditions, or labor violations—even when the franchisor tightly controls operations. Franchisees also lose leverage to challenge franchisor control as an unfair labor practice. The bill's carve-outs (brand standards, training, safety rules, staffing recommendations) allow franchisors to exercise de facto control over employment while remaining legally insulated from joint-employer duties.

Who stands to gain

• large franchise systems (QSR, hospitality, retail)
• franchisors with tight operational control models

Named in the bill

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Department of Labor, franchisors, franchisees, franchise employees, 16 CFR 436.1, Petroleum Marketing Practices Act

Where it stands

11 cosponsors: 10 Republicans, 1 Independents.

• Dec 17, 2025 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in Senate”
• Dec 17, 2025 — Referred to Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions · Congress.gov: “Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions”
• Mar 19, 2026 — Hearing held · Congress.gov: “Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. Hearings held”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

26 lobbying clients named this bill on 34 disclosure filings across 3 quarters, Dec 2025 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $6,955,677 in lobbying spend. A filing names 4 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 97% of bills with at least one filing.

Roger Marshall, the sponsor, reported $1,777,391 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle. $6,500 of that came from 2 PACs tied to these lobbying clients.

• UPS (united Parcel Service) — $1,500,000 on 1 filing
• International Franchise Association — $860,000 on 2 filings
• National Restaurant Association — $790,000 on 1 filing
• AFL-CIO — $760,000 on 1 filing
• Mcdonald's Corporation — $630,000 on 1 filing

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 21, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.