Tax break for moving factories from China—funded by tariffs you pay

What it does

This bill allows U.S. companies to immediately deduct (write off) the full cost of moving inventory, equipment, and supplies from China to the United States in the year they pay for the move. The bill establishes a trust fund that uses tariff revenue collected from Chinese goods to offset the tax revenue lost from these deductions, so the net cost to the federal budget is theoretically zero.

Why we flagged it

The operative mechanism is a tax deduction for relocation costs—a direct reduction in taxable income for corporations moving production from China. While framed as economic policy, it functions as a targeted tax expenditure benefiting firms with the capital and logistics to relocate.

What the text implies

• The tariff trust fund mechanism obscures the true cost: tariffs are passed to consumers and importers, not paid by the Chinese government. The bill effectively funds corporate tax relief by raising prices on imported goods for American consumers.
• The deduction applies to 'amounts paid'—no requirement that the relocation actually occur, only that the company pay for it. A company could claim the deduction, then abandon the move, with no clawback provision visible in the text.
• The bill does not require that relocated jobs stay in the U.S. or that wages meet any standard. A company could move equipment, claim the deduction, then relocate again or automate the facility.
• The trust fund appropriation is permanent and self-executing ('amounts equivalent to tariffs collected'). If tariff policy changes or tariffs are reduced, the fund may be depleted, creating pressure to raise tariffs to sustain the subsidy.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

The bill may benefit workers and communities if it accelerates reshoring and creates domestic jobs, but it primarily delivers a tax subsidy to corporations that choose to relocate. The tariff-funded offset means the cost is borne by consumers and importers paying higher prices on Chinese goods, not by general taxpayers—a hidden cost shift to the public.

Who stands to gain

• manufacturing companies with operations in China
• logistics and relocation service providers
• companies in labor-intensive sectors (textiles, electronics, machinery)

Named in the bill

Secretary of the Treasury, United States person (IRC 7701(a)(30)), Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Section 9601 IRC, China, U.S. tariff system

Where it stands

• Jan 16, 2025 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in House”
• Jan 16, 2025 — Referred to House Committee on Ways and Means · Congress.gov: “Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

1 lobbying clients named this bill on 1 disclosure filings across 1 quarter, Dec 2025 to Dec 2025. Those filings disclosed $10,000 in lobbying spend. A filing names 8 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 0% of bills with at least one filing.

Mark Green, the sponsor, reported $29,535 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle.

• Included Health (formerly Grand Rounds Health) — $10,000 on 1 filing

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jan 19, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.