Government gets power to destroy your stolen data—without asking first

What it does

This bill directs the President, through the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence, to develop strategies to identify stolen U.S. sensitive data and classified information held by foreign entities—including financial, medical, biometric data, intellectual property, and trade secrets—and to determine whether such data has been encrypted or decrypted. If the Secretary and Director jointly determine it serves U.S. economic or national security interests, they may attempt to destroy, manipulate, or recover such data, and must inform affected data owners when practicable. The bill requires a report to Congress within one year.

Why we flagged it

The bill's core mechanism grants executive authority to identify, destroy, manipulate, or recover stolen U.S. data held abroad. While framed as a national security measure, it is functionally a broad delegation of power over citizens' personal data to the executive branch with minimal prior-consent requirements.

What the text implies

• The bill permits destruction or manipulation of citizens' own data (financial, medical, biometric) without explicit prior consent—only 'when practicable' notification is required after the fact, creating a gap between data ownership and control.
• The phrase 'manipulation' of data is undefined and could encompass alteration, deletion, or other modifications beyond recovery, with no clear standard for what constitutes appropriate manipulation.
• The joint determination by Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence is not subject to judicial review, congressional approval, or public disclosure (report may be classified), concentrating power without external check.
• Citizens whose data is destroyed or manipulated have no apparent statutory remedy or recourse if the government's determination of 'national security interest' is later found to be erroneous or pretextual.
• The bill does not require the government to attempt recovery before destruction, nor does it prioritize recovery over destruction, leaving the choice entirely to executive discretion.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

Citizens gain a government effort to address foreign theft of their sensitive data and classified information, potentially protecting national security and recovering compromised personal information. However, the bill grants broad authority to destroy or manipulate citizens' own data without explicit prior consent—only 'when practicable' notification is required—creating a risk that legitimate personal data (financial, medical, biometric) could be destroyed or altered by government action witho

Named in the bill

Secretary of Defense, Director of National Intelligence, President, Congress, Foreign entities, United States persons

Where it stands

1 cosponsor: 1 Republicans.

• Mar 26, 2026 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in Senate”
• Mar 26, 2026 — Referred to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence · Congress.gov: “Read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

1 lobbying clients named this bill on 1 disclosure filings across 1 quarter, Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $71,297 in lobbying spend. A filing names 39 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 0% of bills with at least one filing.

Maggie Hassan, the sponsor, reported $608,285 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle.

• American Library Association — $71,297 on 1 filing

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 24, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.