Ex-Im Bank hides nuclear lending risk from public view
S. 4228 — ACE Nuclear Energy Act of 2026 · Filed by Dave McCormick (R-PA) · 1 cosponsor · Introduced Mar 26, 2026 · Referred to committee
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What it does
This bill amends the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) to exclude nuclear-related financing from its default-rate calculation and permits the Bank's Board to pay up to 100 employees outside federal salary caps. The first change makes nuclear deals look less risky on paper by removing them from the metric used to assess the Bank's overall loan performance. The second allows the Bank to offer market-rate compensation to compete for talent, bypassing standard federal pay scales.
Why we flagged it
The bill's operative mechanism is a targeted exclusion of nuclear financing from Ex-Im Bank's default-rate calculation — a metric used to assess institutional risk. This is a sector-specific accounting carve-out that benefits nuclear exporters by improving the Bank's reported performance, paired with a secondary compensation flexibility for Bank staff.
What the text implies
- Removing nuclear financing from default-rate calculation obscures true portfolio risk to Congress and the public. If nuclear loans default at higher rates than the Bank's overall portfolio, this exclusion will hide that signal, potentially leading to worse lending decisions and greater taxpayer exposure.
- The default-rate metric is a key accountability tool for assessing Ex-Im Bank performance. Carving out an entire sector undermines transparency and may reduce congressional scrutiny of nuclear lending practices.
The full analysis lists 4 implications of this text.
Who stands to gain
nuclear energy exporters and manufacturers; Export-Import Bank (institutional benefit from improved reported metrics); Ex-Im Bank employees (compensation flexibility)