States gain power to disable drones with minimal judicial oversight or pre-action review.

What it does

This bill expands the authority to use drone-disabling technology from federal agencies (DHS, DOJ) to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement and correctional agencies. It requires training and certification through a federal program, mandates reporting of all counter-drone actions within 48 hours, and allows these agencies to use grant funds to purchase counter-drone systems. It also increases criminal penalties for operating drones during felonies, smuggling contraband via drone into prisons, and violating national defense airspace.

Why we flagged it

The bill's core mechanism is a delegation of federal counter-UAS authority to state and local law enforcement, paired with criminal penalties for drone misuse. It is functionally a public-safety and law-enforcement measure, not a corporate giveaway or commemorative act.

• Sections 5(c)–(e) increase criminal penalties for operating drones during felonies, smuggling contraband via drone into prisons, and repeat airspace violations. These are substantively unrelated to the core counter-UAS authority grant and belong in criminal code, not a homeland security delegation bill.
• Sections 3–4 amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act to allow grant funds to purchase both unmanned aircraft systems AND counter-UAS systems. The UAS purchase authority is tangential to counter-UAS delegation and expands grant eligibility beyond the bill's stated purpose.

What the text implies

• The bill exempts counter-UAS actions from federal wiretapping laws (18 U.S.C. §§ 119, 206) and computer-fraud statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 1367), creating a broad safe harbor for electronic surveillance or system interference that would otherwise be illegal.
• State and local agencies may seize and forfeit drones under their own state forfeiture laws, creating financial incentives for counter-UAS deployment and potential abuse of the 'credible threat' standard to generate revenue.
• The bill defines 'credible threat' nowhere in the operative text, relying instead on agency interpretation subject only to post-hoc federal oversight and 48-hour reporting—no pre-action judicial review or warrant requirement.
• Private correctional facilities operating under state contract gain counter-UAS authority, extending law enforcement powers to private entities with minimal direct federal oversight.
• The 48-hour reporting requirement is a disclosure mechanism, not a restraint; agencies may act first and report later, with penalties only for actions taken 'without Federal coordination'—a vague standard that may not prevent unauthorized use.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

Citizens gain a potential public-safety benefit: more agencies can respond to drone threats at events, critical infrastructure, and correctional facilities, with federal oversight and reporting requirements. However, the bill creates significant civil liberties risks: it grants broad authority to disable aircraft with minimal pre-action judicial review, relies on vague standards ('credible threat'), and exempts these actions from wiretapping and computer-fraud laws, potentially enabling abuse wi

Who stands to gain

• Counter-UAS technology manufacturers and vendors (systems on the authorized list)
• Defense contractors supplying training and certification infrastructure
• State and local law enforcement agencies (grant funding for equipment purchase)
• Private correctional facility operators (expanded authority without direct federal liability)

Named in the bill

Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Communications Commission, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies, Correctional facilities (public and private), Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security

Where it stands

3 cosponsors: 2 Republicans, 1 Democrats.

• Dec 15, 2025 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in Senate”
• Dec 15, 2025 — Referred to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs · Congress.gov: “Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

2 lobbying clients named this bill on 2 disclosure filings across 1 quarter, Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $1,066,000 in lobbying spend. A filing names 33 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 41% of bills with at least one filing.

Gary Peters, the sponsor, reported $-186,100 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle.

• U.S. Travel Association — $800,000 on 1 filing
• Air Line Pilots Association — $266,000 on 1 filing

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 20, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.