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Congress moves to wall off the Fed from political appointees

S. 2817 — Fed Integrity and Independence Act of 2025 · Filed by Ruben Gallego (D-AZ) · 8 cosponsors · Introduced Sep 16, 2025 · Referred to committee

85%
Transparency
Typical bill: 82%
15/100
Hidden-provision risk
Typical bill: 15/100
Federal Reserve Governance Reform

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What it does

This bill amends the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit Federal Reserve employees and board members from simultaneously holding other positions appointed by the President. It bars dual appointments for Board of Governors members, Federal Reserve Bank presidents, vice presidents, officers, employees, and board directors—closing a loophole that allowed people to take leaves of absence from government jobs while working at the Fed. The stated purpose is to prevent conflicts of interest and protect the Fed's independence from political pressure.

Why we flagged it

The bill's core mechanism is a straightforward structural prohibition on dual appointments within the Federal Reserve System. It is a governance measure designed to reduce conflicts of interest and protect institutional independence, not a financial carve-out or subsidy.

What the text implies

  • The prohibition on leave-of-absence workarounds may affect the Fed's ability to recruit talent from government agencies, potentially narrowing the pool of experienced financial regulators available for Fed positions.
  • The bill does not define 'appointed by the President' with precision—it is unclear whether this covers positions appointed by agency heads (who are themselves presidential appointees) or only direct presidential appointments, creating potential ambiguity in enforcement.

The full analysis lists 3 implications of this text.

Who it affects

The bill restricts government officials' ability to hold dual positions that could create conflicts of interest and undermine the Federal Reserve's independence from political pressure. Ordinary citizens benefit from a more insulated, credible monetary authority less vulnerable to short-term political manipulation of interest rates and financial regulation.

Correlative observation from public records — not evidence of coordination or wrongdoing, and not financial advice.
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Quorum analysis of the full bill text · 119th Congress · public record