Federal government takes on catastrophe insurance tail risk for private insurers
S. 2349 — INSURE Act · Filed by Adam Schiff (D-CA) · 1 cosponsor · Introduced Jul 17, 2025 · Referred to committee
Your members of Congress
Enter a ZIP to see where your representative and both senators stood on this bill.
Looked up on this device — your ZIP is never stored on our servers.
What it does
This bill directs the Treasury Secretary to establish a federal reinsurance program for catastrophic property losses (wind, hurricane, wildfire, severe storms, flood, and potentially earthquake). Participating insurers pay premiums into a federal fund and receive reinsurance payments when losses exceed a threshold. The program phases in over 4–8 years, requires insurers to offer loss-prevention partnerships with policyholders, and includes a pilot program for multi-year property insurance policies. A Treasury-backed fund issues bonds if premiums are insufficient to cover claims.
Why we flagged it
The bill's operative mechanism is a federal backstop for private insurers' catastrophe losses. While framed as a public-interest measure to stabilize insurance markets and promote loss prevention, the primary financial beneficiary is the insurance industry, which offloads tail risk to the federal government and taxpayers.
What the text implies
- The 40% threshold for federal reinsurance means insurers retain 60% of probable maximum loss, but the federal government absorbs losses beyond that threshold indefinitely—a one-way transfer of tail risk to taxpayers.
- Premium minimums (50% of expected losses + admin costs) may be below actuarial cost, effectively subsidizing insurers' catastrophe exposure and reducing market discipline on pricing.
- The multi-year policy pilot (Section 5) locks in rates for 5+ years but allows insurers to increase premiums based on construction costs and home values—not catastrophe risk—creating a rate-lock benefit for policyholders but also reducing insurer flexibility to adjust for actual risk.
- Data collection and sharing with the Office of Financial Research and Federal Insurance Office centralizes catastrophe-risk intelligence in federal hands, potentially enabling future regulatory or pricing interventions.
- The advisory committee includes only 5 consumer representatives vs. 3 insurers, 2 reinsurers, 2 mortgage/bank representatives, and 8 federal agencies—structural imbalance favoring industry input on program design.
Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.
Who it affects
Citizens gain access to more stable and affordable property insurance in high-risk areas, and the program incentivizes loss prevention. However, the program is structured primarily to benefit insurers by capping their losses and reducing their capital requirements; the public bears the tail risk through federal bonds backed by taxpayers, and the threshold (up to 40% of probable maximum loss) means insurers retain substantial exposure before federal reinsurance kicks in.
Who stands to gain
- primary property insurers (admitted and non-admitted)
- reinsurance companies (global and domestic)
- mortgage lenders and banks (reduced credit risk from insured properties)
- insurance brokers and consultants (contracted for program design and management)
Named in the bill
Secretary of the Treasury, Federal Catastrophe Reinsurance Fund, State insurance departments, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Office of Financial Research, Federal Insurance Office, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Financial Stability Oversight Council
Where it stands
1 cosponsor: 1 Democrats.
- Jul 17, 2025 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in Senate”
- Jul 17, 2025 — Referred to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs · Congress.gov: “Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs”
Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.
Money around this bill
3 lobbying clients named this bill on 4 disclosure filings across 1 quarter, Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $1,970,000 in lobbying spend. A filing names 68 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.
More lobbying clients named this bill than 61% of bills with at least one filing.
Adam Schiff, the sponsor, reported $54,400 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle.
- Mortgage Bankers Association — $1,220,000 on 1 filing
- Reinsurance Assn of America — $710,000 on 2 filings
- Reinsurance Association of America — $40,000 on 1 filing
Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 23, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.
How this was measured
Analysis — Quorum's AI read the bill text published by Congress.gov (15,890 characters) on Sep 5, 2026. Section numbers in the findings refer to that text, linked below; transparency and hidden-provision scores are compared against the median of 16,222 analysed bills.
Status and sponsors — Congress.gov's bill record — actions, committee referrals and cosponsors — loaded nightly. The timeline shows status changes, not every procedural action.
Money — Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act filings whose specific-issue field names this bill for quarters ending Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. A filing's amount is reported whole beside the median number of bills a filing names; it is never divided across them. PAC receipts are FEC-reported contributions to the sponsor's candidate committee in the 2026 cycle.
As of — lobbying records through Jul 23, 2026 · page rendered 2026-10-21.
“Federal government takes on catastrophe insurance tail risk for private insurers” QuorumCivic. https://share.quorumcivic.app/bill/119/s2349 Report an error
The week in bills
One email, Sunday: what Congress passed, what it changed, and who paid.
One link arrives to confirm the address. It is used for this email and nothing else, and every issue carries an unsubscribe link.