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Tax credits aim to rebuild U.S. magnet supply chain, reduce China dependence

H.R. 9227 — Magnets Value Chain Support Act of 2026 · Filed by John Moolenaar (R-MI) · 2 cosponsors · Introduced Jun 9, 2026 · Referred to committee

72%
Transparency
Typical bill: 85%
18/100
Hidden-provision risk
Typical bill: 15/100
Industrial Supply-Chain Tax Incentive

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What it does

This bill creates two new federal tax credits to incentivize domestic production of permanent magnets and magnet metals, and to encourage U.S. manufacturers to use domestically-produced magnets in their products. The credits pay manufacturers $5–$40 per kilogram for producing rare earth oxides, magnet metals, and permanent magnets in the U.S., with higher payments for higher-performance magnets and higher domestic content. A second credit reimburses 5–15% of the cost of purchasing domestically-made magnets for use in motors, generators, and defense-related equipment. The bill aims to reduce U.S. dependence on Chinese rare earth and magnet supplies.

Why we flagged it

The bill's core mechanism is a tiered tax credit for domestic magnet production and use, structured to incentivize reshoring of a critical supply chain. It is not deregulation, not a subsidy in the traditional sense (credits are tied to production), and not a carve-out for a single company—it is a broad sectoral incentive aimed at a strategic industry.

What the text implies

  • The bill's success depends on manufacturers actually claiming credits and reinvesting in domestic capacity; if credits are claimed but production remains offshore or minimal, the public bears the tax cost with no supply-chain benefit.
  • The 'prohibited foreign entity' definition (cross-referenced to section 7701(a)(51)(A)) is not quoted in this text; the scope of entities barred from the supply chain is opaque without reviewing that external definition.
  • The Secretary has broad discretion to designate non-partner-country facilities as 'qualifying' and to waive the 3% domestic production-capacity requirement; this creates regulatory flexibility but also potential for inconsistent application.
  • The credit terminates after 2038, creating a cliff; manufacturers may face stranded assets or sudden cost increases if credits expire without renewal.
  • Downstream users (e.g., automotive, aerospace manufacturers) receive a 5–15% cost rebate only for 'covered products'; the definition of 'covered products' is broad but excludes 'low-power consumer appliances,' potentially limiting benefits to industrial and defense sectors.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

The bill addresses a genuine national security concern (Chinese dominance of rare earth and magnet supply chains) and may reduce long-term supply-chain risk and product costs for consumers. However, the primary direct beneficiaries are manufacturers and industrial users receiving tax credits; the public benefit is indirect and depends on whether manufacturers pass savings to consumers and whether the credits succeed in reshoring production at scale.

Who stands to gain

  • domestic rare earth oxide producers
  • domestic magnet metal manufacturers
  • domestic permanent magnet manufacturers
  • industrial equipment manufacturers using magnets (motors, generators, robotics)
  • aerospace and defense contractors
  • automotive manufacturers (if electric vehicle powertrains qualify as covered products)

Named in the bill

Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Section 45BB (Magnet Value Chain Support Credit), Section 45CC (Domestic Magnet Input Usage Credit), Section 45X (existing clean hydrogen credit, referenced for non-duplication), Section 482 (transfer pricing rules), Defense Production Act of 1950, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Secretary of the Treasury, Committee on Ways and Means, Committee on Finance, People's Republic of China (referenced in findings) — and 2 more

Where it stands

2 cosponsors: 2 Democrats.

  • Jun 9, 2026 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in House”
  • Jun 9, 2026 — Referred to House Committee on Ways and Means · Congress.gov: “Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

7 lobbying clients named this bill on 7 disclosure filings across 1 quarter, Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $2,117,000 in lobbying spend. A filing names 12 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 86% of bills with at least one filing.

John Moolenaar, the sponsor, reported $573,600 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle. $2,500 of that came from 1 PAC tied to these lobbying clients.

  • American Honda Motor Co., Inc. — $1,477,000 on 1 filing
  • Fdd Action — $240,000 on 1 filing
  • Joby Aero, Inc. — $180,000 on 1 filing
  • Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International — $150,000 on 1 filing
  • Securing America's Future Energy Alliance — $40,000 on 1 filing

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 20, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.

How this was measured

Analysis — Quorum's AI read the bill text published by Congress.gov (28,471 characters) on Sep 26, 2026. Section numbers in the findings refer to that text, linked below; transparency and hidden-provision scores are compared against the median of 15,166 analysed bills.

Status and sponsors — Congress.gov's bill record — actions, committee referrals and cosponsors — loaded nightly. The timeline shows status changes, not every procedural action.

Money — Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act filings whose specific-issue field names this bill for quarters ending Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. A filing's amount is reported whole beside the median number of bills a filing names; it is never divided across them. PAC receipts are FEC-reported contributions to the sponsor's candidate committee in the 2026 cycle.

As of — lobbying records through Jul 20, 2026 · page rendered 2026-09-26.

“Tax credits aim to rebuild U.S. magnet supply chain, reduce China dependence” QuorumCivic. https://share.quorumcivic.app/bill/119/hr9227 Report an error

Correlative observation from public records — not evidence of coordination or wrongdoing, and not financial advice.
This page is the record as of today. The app tells you when it changes.
Quorum analysis of the full bill text · 119th Congress · public record