Feds must name targets before surveilling their messages—and tell them about it.

What it does

This bill restricts how federal agencies can use administrative subpoenas to obtain customer communications and records from phone, email, and messaging service providers. It requires agencies to identify specific customers by name or account before issuing a subpoena (blocking bulk collection), prohibits subpoenas aimed at investigating constitutionally protected speech or retaliating against activists, mandates agencies certify under penalty of perjury that subpoenas serve legitimate purposes, allows service providers to notify customers and consult lawyers about subpoenas unless a court orders secrecy, and requires federal agencies to publicly report annually how many subpoenas they issue and how many accounts they target.

Why we flagged it

The bill's core function is to restrict government surveillance authority over digital communications by requiring specificity, constitutional compliance, transparency, and service-provider notification—a civil-liberties measure, not a technical amendment.

What the text implies

• Perjury-backed certification requirement may deter some legitimate investigations if agencies fear prosecution for borderline cases, potentially creating a chilling effect on law enforcement.
• Service-provider notification rights (absent a court order) may alert targets of investigations before evidence is secured, depending on how quickly providers notify customers.
• Public reporting of subpoena counts by statutory authority may reveal which federal agencies rely most heavily on administrative subpoenas, creating political pressure to reduce their use.
• The bill does not address state or local law enforcement use of administrative subpoenas—only federal agencies—leaving a gap in protection at the state level.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

Ordinary citizens gain concrete protections: agencies cannot secretly surveil their communications based on protected speech, bulk collection is blocked, service providers can warn them of subpoenas, and public reporting creates accountability. The bill does not eliminate legitimate law enforcement access—it channels it through named-customer identification and constitutional guardrails.

Named in the bill

Federal law enforcement agencies, Service providers (phone, email, messaging platforms), 18 U.S.C. § 2703, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)

Where it stands

3 cosponsors: 2 Republicans, 1 Democrats.

• May 21, 2026 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in House”
• May 21, 2026 — Referred to House Committee on the Judiciary · Congress.gov: “Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

2 lobbying clients named this bill on 2 disclosure filings across 1 quarter, Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $170,000 in lobbying spend. A filing names 8 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 41% of bills with at least one filing.

Adriano Espaillat, the sponsor, reported $497,550 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle.

• Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. — $120,000 on 1 filing
• Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. — $50,000 on 1 filing

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 20, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.