Congress ties U.S. IMF vote to China's currency practices—with a presidential escape hatch.

What it does

This bill requires the U.S. Treasury Secretary to report to Congress before any IMF voting-power increase for China, assessing whether China meets three criteria: no recent violations of IMF Article VIII obligations, transparent exchange-rate policies and credible data publication, and no persistent currency manipulation for trade advantage. If China fails any criterion, the U.S. must vote against the increase at the IMF—unless the President waives the requirement on national-interest grounds. The mandate expires after 7 years.

Why we flagged it

The bill is a procedural constraint on U.S. IMF voting tied to China's compliance with currency and trade practices. It is not a direct trade sanction or tariff, but rather a governance mechanism designed to align IMF voting with U.S. trade and currency-stability interests.

What the text implies

• The criteria for assessing China's compliance are subjective and rely on 'publicly available data'—if such data is incomplete or disputed, the Secretary's determination may be contested or inconsistent.
• The President's waiver authority is broad and requires only a national-interest justification reported to Congress; Congress has no veto, so the entire mandate can be suspended unilaterally.
• The bill does not define what constitutes 'persistent' currency manipulation or 'unfair competitive advantage,' leaving significant discretion to the Secretary and creating potential for political pressure.
• A 7-year sunset means the mandate expires unless Congress affirmatively reauthorizes it, shifting the burden to proponents of continued enforcement.
• The bill applies only to voting-power increases for China, not to other IMF governance changes or to other countries' currency practices, narrowing its scope.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

The bill creates a transparency mechanism and procedural constraint on U.S. IMF voting, potentially protecting U.S. interests in trade and currency stability. However, the criteria are subjective ("does not appear to have been in violation," "transparent" policies, "persistent" manipulation), the President can waive the entire requirement on national-interest grounds, and the practical impact on ordinary Americans depends on whether the criteria are enforced and whether the waiver is used—making

Named in the bill

People's Republic of China, International Monetary Fund (IMF), U.S. Treasury Secretary, U.S. Governor of the Fund, House Committee on Financial Services, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Articles of Agreement of the Fund, Article VIII (IMF)

Where it stands

• Apr 15, 2026 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in House”
• Apr 15, 2026 — Referred to House Committee on Financial Services · Congress.gov: “Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services”
• Apr 21, 2026 — Markup held in committee · Congress.gov: “Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held”
• Apr 21, 2026 — Reported out of committee · Congress.gov: “Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 32 - 20”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

1 lobbying clients named this bill on 1 disclosure filings across 1 quarter, Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $120,000 in lobbying spend. A filing names 13 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 0% of bills with at least one filing.

Pete Sessions, the sponsor, reported $561,450 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle.

• Philanthropy Roundtable — $120,000 on 1 filing

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 20, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.