Congress bans Chinese battery imports citing spy fears—but the threat is unproven.
H.R. 7635 — CHARGE Act · Filed by W. Steube (R-FL) · Introduced Feb 20, 2026 · Referred to committee
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What it does
This bill prohibits U.S. imports of energy storage systems (batteries, power storage devices) made by Chinese entities or under Chinese Communist Party control if they contain remote monitoring capabilities. The bill treats such imports as a national security threat, claiming they could allow China to spy on or sabotage the U.S. electrical grid. Violators face up to 5 years in prison and $250,000 fines per shipment; U.S. Customs and Border Protection must enforce the ban within 60 days.
Why we flagged it
The bill's operative mechanism is an import ban on a specific category of goods (Chinese energy storage systems with remote monitoring) justified on national security grounds. While framed as infrastructure protection, it functions as a targeted trade restriction that may protect domestic manufacturers.
What the text implies
- The definition of 'remote monitoring capability' is so broad ('capable of observing, collecting, analyzing, and disrupting data') that it could encompass standard remote diagnostics, firmware updates, and performance monitoring—features common in modern energy storage systems regardless of origin.
- The ban applies to systems 'manufactured with technology licensed or owned by' Chinese entities, which could capture U.S.-designed systems manufactured under license or using licensed components, creating unintended collateral damage to legitimate supply chains.
- CBP must identify and enforce the ban within 60 days without clear technical standards or testing protocols, creating high risk of inconsistent enforcement, false positives, and litigation over what qualifies as 'remote monitoring.'
- The bill grants CBP authority to 'impose additional restrictions' annually without congressional approval, creating a regulatory ratchet that could expand the ban beyond energy storage systems or Chinese entities over time.
- Domestic energy storage manufacturers (Tesla, Eos, Form Energy, etc.) benefit from reduced Chinese competition, but consumers may face higher prices and reduced supply if Chinese imports are the primary source of affordable battery storage.
Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.
Who it affects
The bill addresses a legitimate national security concern—protecting critical infrastructure from foreign surveillance or sabotage—which benefits all citizens. However, the mechanism is extremely broad and vague ("remote monitoring capabilities" is undefined in technical terms), creating enforcement uncertainty and potential for overreach that could disrupt energy storage supply chains, raise costs for consumers, and chill legitimate technology imports without clear evidence that the threat is i
Who stands to gain
- U.S. energy storage manufacturers
- Domestic battery and power electronics companies
- American renewable energy equipment suppliers
Named in the bill
People's Republic of China, Chinese Communist Party, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Commerce (SecDOC), Department of Energy (SecDOE), Department of Homeland Security (SecDHS), House Committee on Energy and Commerce, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Where it stands
- Feb 20, 2026 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in House”
- Feb 20, 2026 — Referred to House Committee on Ways and Means · Congress.gov: “Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means”
Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.
Money around this bill
1 lobbying clients named this bill on 1 disclosure filings across 1 quarter, Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $3,160,000 in lobbying spend. A filing names 5 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.
More lobbying clients named this bill than 0% of bills with at least one filing.
W. Steube, the sponsor, reported $646,500 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle. $3,500 of that came from 1 PAC tied to these lobbying clients.
- Bristol-myers Squibb Company — $3,160,000 on 1 filing
Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 20, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.
How this was measured
Analysis — Quorum's AI read the bill text published by Congress.gov (3,782 characters) on Aug 18, 2026. Section numbers in the findings refer to that text, linked below; transparency and hidden-provision scores are compared against the median of 16,222 analysed bills.
Status and sponsors — Congress.gov's bill record — actions, committee referrals and cosponsors — loaded nightly. The timeline shows status changes, not every procedural action.
Money — Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act filings whose specific-issue field names this bill for quarters ending Jun 2026 to Jun 2026. A filing's amount is reported whole beside the median number of bills a filing names; it is never divided across them. PAC receipts are FEC-reported contributions to the sponsor's candidate committee in the 2026 cycle.
As of — lobbying records through Jul 20, 2026 · page rendered 2026-10-20.
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