D.C. Raises Mandatory Prison Minimums, Limiting Judges' Sentencing Discretion

What it does

This bill increases mandatory minimum prison sentences for serious crimes in Washington, D.C., including raising first-degree murder from 30 years to life without parole, second-degree murder to a minimum of 10 years, rape and sexual abuse to 25–30 years, kidnapping to 10–30 years, carjacking to 10–20 years, and first-degree burglary to 10 years. The changes apply only to crimes committed after the bill's enactment and remove some judicial discretion in sentencing.

Why we flagged it

The bill's sole operative mechanism is raising mandatory minimum sentences for six categories of D.C. crimes. It is a straightforward sentencing-policy measure with no hidden riders or private beneficiaries.

What the text implies

• Removes judicial discretion to impose sentences below the new minimums, even in cases with strong mitigating circumstances (youth, mental illness, duress, minor role in crime).
• Eliminates the requirement that courts find aggravating circumstances before imposing sentences above 30 years for sexual abuse, shifting burden and reducing appellate review.
• Applies retroactively to conduct occurring after enactment, not to sentences already imposed, but may affect plea negotiations and sentencing guidelines going forward.
• Increases D.C. Department of Corrections population and operating costs without corresponding appropriations or reentry/rehabilitation funding.
• May disproportionately affect lower-income defendants who cannot afford private counsel and may be less able to negotiate favorable plea deals.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

Longer sentences may deter crime and protect public safety through incapacitation, but mandatory minimums eliminate judicial discretion to account for individual circumstances, potentially increasing incarceration of people with mitigating factors and raising criminal-justice system costs. The net public benefit depends on empirical deterrence effects, which the bill does not establish.

Who stands to gain

• D.C. Department of Corrections (increased operating budget demand)
• Private prison operators (if D.C. contracts out overflow capacity)
• Legal services providers (appellate and post-conviction litigation)

Named in the bill

District of Columbia, D.C. Department of Corrections, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, D.C. Official Code (Sections 22–2104, 22–2803, 22–801, 24–403)

Where it stands

2 cosponsors: 2 Republicans.

• Sep 8, 2025 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in House”
• Sep 8, 2025 — Referred to House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform · Congress.gov: “Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform”
• Sep 10, 2025 — Markup held in committee · Congress.gov: “Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held”
• Sep 10, 2025 — Reported out of committee · Congress.gov: “Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 26 - 19”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

1 lobbying clients named this bill on 2 disclosure filings across 2 quarters, Dec 2025 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $66,304 in lobbying spend. A filing names 17 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 0% of bills with at least one filing.

Andy Biggs, the sponsor, reported $9,100 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle.

• The Sentencing Project — $66,304 on 2 filings

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 20, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.