Retirement accounts: DOL loses power to police what fiduciaries can sell

What it does

This bill amends federal pension law to prohibit the Department of Labor from restricting what types of investments individual retirement account holders can choose when they control their own accounts. It allows plan fiduciaries to offer self-directed brokerage windows without DOL oversight of what investments are available, and shields fiduciaries from liability if participants choose risky or unconventional investments through those windows.

Why we flagged it

The bill's operative mechanism is a carve-out from DOL regulatory authority—it does not expand participant rights directly, but rather removes constraints on what fiduciaries can offer and shields them from liability. The framing as 'financial freedom' masks a deregulatory shift that benefits financial intermediaries (brokers, custodians) and fiduciaries more than participants.

What the text implies

• Removes DOL guidance on unsuitable or predatory investment offerings in self-directed accounts, shifting fraud/suitability risk from fiduciaries to individual participants who may lack investment expertise.
• Creates incentive for plan sponsors and custodians to offer self-directed brokerage windows with high-fee, high-commission, or speculative products (crypto, penny stocks, commodities) without regulatory review or fiduciary liability.
• Participants in self-directed accounts lose the protection of DOL-enforced diversification and prudence standards when exercising control—a particular risk for unsophisticated investors.
• The 'broad range of investment alternatives' standard is undefined and unenforceable by DOL, potentially allowing fiduciaries to offer only high-margin products while claiming compliance.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

Participants in self-directed accounts gain freedom to invest in a broader range of assets (potentially higher returns, but also higher risk), and fiduciaries face reduced regulatory burden. However, the bill removes DOL oversight that previously constrained fiduciaries from offering predatory, speculative, or unsuitable investments—shifting investment risk entirely to individual participants who may lack expertise, and creating incentives for fiduciaries to offer high-fee or high-commission pro

Who stands to gain

• self-directed brokerage platforms and custodians
• alternative investment promoters (crypto exchanges, commodities brokers)
• financial advisors and brokers earning commissions on participant trades
• plan sponsors avoiding fiduciary liability

Named in the bill

Department of Labor, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Section 404(a), self-directed brokerage windows, pension plan fiduciaries, individual retirement account participants

Where it stands

• Apr 1, 2025 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in House”
• Apr 1, 2025 — Referred to House Committee on Education and Workforce · Congress.gov: “Referred to the House Committee on Education and Workforce”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

5 lobbying clients named this bill on 10 disclosure filings across 2 quarters, Dec 2025 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $5,375,837 in lobbying spend. A filing names 18 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 78% of bills with at least one filing.

Byron Donalds, the sponsor, reported $66,946 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle.

• American Council of Life Insurers — $4,085,837 on 3 filings
• Ameriprise Financial, Inc. — $700,000 on 2 filings
• Franklin Resources, Inc. (franklin Templeton) and Affiliates — $540,000 on 2 filings
• Franklin Templeton Funds — $50,000 on 1 filing
• Fmr LLC — $0 on 2 filings

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 22, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.