U.S. tightens grip on undersea cables to block China, Russia

What it does

This bill requires the President to develop a strategy to prevent foreign adversaries (primarily China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) from obtaining goods and technologies needed to build, maintain, or operate undersea cables—the fiber-optic lines that carry most global internet and telecommunications traffic. The bill mandates the administration identify critical items, coordinate with allies on export controls, negotiate multilateral agreements to restrict sales, and evaluate whether to add technologies to the U.S. Commerce Control List. The strategy must be reported to Congress within 180 days and annually for three years.

Why we flagged it

The bill's operative mechanism is export control policy—identifying critical undersea cable technologies and restricting their sale to foreign adversaries through multilateral coordination. This is a core national security function, not a subsidy, deregulation, or private carve-out.

What the text implies

• The bill may indirectly benefit U.S. telecommunications and defense contractors by creating a protected market for undersea cable equipment and services, as foreign competitors lose access to certain technologies and markets.
• Aggressive export controls on undersea cable technologies could slow global internet infrastructure development in non-aligned countries, potentially widening the digital divide and increasing U.S. geopolitical leverage over telecommunications routes.
• The requirement to identify foreign entities 'under the control, ownership, or influence' of adversaries may cast a wide net, potentially affecting joint ventures, supply chains, and legitimate commercial relationships involving Chinese, Russian, or Iranian firms.
• The bill's focus on international standards-setting bodies suggests the administration will seek to shape global technical standards in favor of U.S. and allied interests, which could fragment global internet infrastructure and raise costs for developing nations.

Section numbers refer to the bill text the analysis read — linked under Primary records below.

Who it affects

The bill strengthens U.S. national security and democratic resilience by restricting adversaries' access to critical telecommunications infrastructure, which is essential to protecting Americans' communications, financial systems, and election integrity. The mechanism is transparent export control policy, not a hidden subsidy or liability shield, and the public reporting requirement enhances accountability.

Who stands to gain

• U.S. telecommunications equipment manufacturers
• U.S. defense contractors with undersea cable expertise
• U.S. and allied cable operators and internet service providers
• Domestic technology firms competing in export-controlled sectors

Named in the bill

Department of Commerce (SecDOC), Department of State, Department of Defense (SecDef), House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Export Administration Regulations (EAR), Commerce Control List, Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Foreign adversaries (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea)

Where it stands

2 cosponsors: 1 Democrats, 1 Republicans.

• Mar 31, 2025 — Introduced · Congress.gov: “Introduced in House”
• Mar 31, 2025 — Referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs · Congress.gov: “Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs”
• Apr 9, 2025 — Markup held in committee · Congress.gov: “Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held”
• Apr 9, 2025 — Reported out of committee · Congress.gov: “Ordered to be Reported by Voice Vote”
• Sep 2, 2025 — Passed the House · Congress.gov: “On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by voice vote. (text: CR H3733-3734)”
• Sep 2, 2025 — Floor vote scheduled · Congress.gov: “Mr. Baumgartner moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill”

Dates and quoted wording are Congress.gov's action record; the timeline shows status changes, not every procedural step.

Money around this bill

2 lobbying clients named this bill on 5 disclosure filings across 2 quarters, Dec 2025 to Jun 2026. Those filings disclosed $7,070,000 in lobbying spend. A filing names 1 bills on average, so that figure is what each filing reported, not a share belonging to this bill.

More lobbying clients named this bill than 41% of bills with at least one filing.

Thomas Kean, the sponsor, reported $1,220,477 in PAC receipts in the 2026 cycle.

• Google Client Services LLC — $6,920,000 on 2 filings
• Skywest, Inc. — $150,000 on 3 filings

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings through Jul 20, 2026. A filing shows who paid to lobby on a bill it names, not what changed.