Congress proposes supermajority lock on federal borrowing—could cripple crisis response
H.J.Res. 9 — Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting the United States Government from increasing its debt except for a specific purpose by law adopted by three-fourths of the membership of each House of Congress. · Filed by Tom McClintock (R-CA) · 3 cosponsors · Introduced Jan 3, 2025 · Referred to committee
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What it does
This is a proposed constitutional amendment that would require any increase in the federal debt to be approved by a supermajority (75%) of both the House and Senate, and only for a specific stated purpose. The amendment would take effect ten years after ratification. It does not change current law; it proposes a new constitutional rule that would make borrowing far more difficult and require extraordinary consensus to increase the national debt.
Why we flagged it
The bill proposes a structural constitutional amendment that would fundamentally alter the federal government's borrowing authority by imposing a supermajority requirement. It is a straightforward constitutional proposal with no hidden mechanisms—the stated purpose and operative mechanism are identical.
What the text implies
- A 75% supermajority requirement in both chambers is extraordinarily high and would likely make emergency borrowing during recessions, pandemics, or wars extremely difficult or impossible without near-unanimous support.
- The ten-year delayed implementation creates a window during which current fiscal policy continues unchanged, but markets and long-term planning may begin pricing in future constraints immediately upon ratification.
The full analysis lists 4 implications of this text.
Who it affects
The amendment would constrain government borrowing, which could reduce deficit spending and long-term debt burdens (a potential public benefit), but would also severely restrict the government's ability to respond to emergencies, recessions, wars, or public crises without extraordinary supermajority consensus—potentially forcing spending cuts or service reductions during crises when borrowing is most needed. The trade-off between fiscal discipline and crisis flexibility is genuine and unresolved